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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Pakistan has initiated a comprehensive reforms efforts aiming at tracking the 
economy on a higher and sustainable economic growth, reduce level of poverty, 
reducing unemployment, raising their level of standard of living. These objective were 
to be achieved through a programme that would build on the macro-economic stability 
which encompasses structural reforms, trade liberalisation, privatisation, fiscal reforms 
and financial sector. 
This paper makes one of the early attempt to analyse the Pakistan stabilisation 
experiences. In Pakistan the stabilisation programme was started in 1988-89. In this paper 
we mainly examine the fiscal and monetary policy package since 1988 when the Pakistan 
committed to a set of conditionalities under the Structural Adjustment Programme of the 
IMF.  The fundamental question that has risen was the relative efficacy of stabilisation 
oriented versus growth oriented policies on development and welfare. Admittedly, 
stabilisation and growth are not mutually exclusive and any policy package has to 
incorporate both the elements. However, the manner in which the policy has been 
implemented in Pakistan has tended to pursue stabilisation at the expense of growth. 
The analysis in this study is outcome based and outcomes are: GDP growth, poverty 
numbers, unemployment rate, inflation and private investment. The target variables are 
current account deficit and budget deficit. The policy discussed are fiscal policy, monetary 
policy and trade policy. Since the fiscal policy is main driver in this process we therefore, 
concentrate mainly on fiscal policy in this study. Other policies and measures are touched 
upon in this paper but have to discuss thoroughly separately. The analysis is based on the 
results obtained from SPDC’s 257—equation Integrated Social Policy and Macroeconomic 
Planning Model for Pakistan. The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 present review 
of literature, Section 3 presents a review of macroeconomic developments, Section 4 
profiles the trends in fiscal variables, Section 5 examine the implication of stabilisation 
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efforts on macroeconomic variables, Section 6 analyse the way stabilisation are achieved 
and Section 7 presents conclusions and recommendations. 
 
2.  REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Subramanian (1997) discussed the Egyptian Stabilisation experiences and found 
that the was successful experience in Egypt. In Egypt fiscal adjustment and exchange 
rate manipulation were main driving forces supported by prudent monetary policy and 
liberalised interest and exchange markets reforms. The analysis which is outcome based 
shows positive-impact of stabilisation policy. World Bank (1995) also shows positive 
result of stabilisation policies for Bangladesh. 
 
3.  MACROECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS 
The basic point of the economic policies pursued under various governments 
since 1988, when the Structural Adjustment Programme came into force, is its 
continuity. The fiscal policy till  2001-02 constitutes a continuation of the same set of 
policies, albeit with greater vigour. It is, thus, pertinent to conduct the analysis in the 
light of the performance of key economic indicators during 1988–2001 and examine the 
fiscal policy accordingly. 
The most important feature of the economic policies of the 1988–2001 period is 
the dominance of stabilisation objectives at the cost of growth. This is evident from 
Table 1, which shows the stabilisation variables, i.e., Current Account Gap to GDP 
Ratio and Budget Deficit to GDP Ratio have declined according to objectives dictated 
by international creditor interests. The Current Account Gap to GDP Ratio has declined 
from an average of 4.0–4.5 percent in the decade of the 1980s and 1990s to 1.9 percent 
in 1999-00 and further to 1.1 percent in 2000-01. Likewise, the Budget Deficit to GDP 
Ratio has declined from an average of 6.7 percent in the 1980s to 6.1 percent in the 
1990s and further to 5.4 percent in 2000-01.  Growth variables, i.e., GDP Growth Rate 
and Fixed Investment to GDP Ratio have also declined contrary to objectives dictated by 
the needs of the people. The GDP Growth Rate has declined from an average of 6.1 
percent in the 1980s to 4.4 percent in the 1990s, to 3.9 percent in 1999-2000, and further 
to 2.6 percent in 2000-01. Likewise, Fixed Investment to GDP Ratio has declined from 
an average of 16-17 percent in the 1980s and 1990s to 13-14 percent in the last two 
years, i.e., 1999-01. 
The impact of such a policy framework has been borne by the people. 
Unemployment has increased from an average of 3.5 percent in the 1980s to 5.7 percent 
in the 1990s, to 6.2 percent in 1999-00, and further to 6.7 percent in 2000-01. Poverty 
has increased from an average of 23.2 percent in the 1980s to 26.0 percent in the 1990s, 
to 35.9 percent in 1999-00, and further to 40.1 percent in 2000-01. 
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Table 1 
Profile of Macroeconomic Development 
(Percent) 
 
Indicator 
1980-81 
to 
1989-90
1990-91 
to 
1994-95
1995-96 
to 
1999-00
1990-91 
to 
1999-00
 
1999-00
 
2000-01 
GDP Growth (fc) 6.1 5.1 3.8 4.4 3.9 2.6 
GDP Growth(mp) 6.2 4.8 3.1 4.0 4.4 3.3 
Agriculture  4.1 4.2 4.9 4.5 6.1 –2.5 
Manufacturing 8.2 5.8 2.0 3.9 1.8 7.1 
Services 6.6 5.3 3.8 4.6 3.5 3.5 
Inflation Rate 7.2 11.7 7.7 9.7 3.9 5.4 
Money Supply to GDP Ratio 39.4 43.0 44.2 43.6 44.1 42.5 
Fixed Investment to GDP Ratio 17.8 17.0 15.1 16.1 13.9 13.4 
Public Investment 9.8 8.7 6.5 7.6 5.9 6.0 
Private Investment 8.0 8.3 8.6 8.5 8.0 7.4 
Real Exports to GDP Ratio 13.1 17.9 14.7 16.3 14.6 16.3 
Real Imports to GDP Ratio 20.3 17.7 16.5 17.1 14.2 13.8 
Current Account Gap to GDP Ratio  4.0 4.5 4.4 4.5 1.9 1.1 
Budget Deficit to GDP Ratio 6.7 6.4 5.9 6.1 6.6 5.4 
Nominal Exchange Rate 15.6 26.8 42.7 34.8 51.7 57.2 
Poverty Rate* 23.2 22.8 29.3 26.0 35.9 40.1 
Unemployment Rate* 3.5 5.4 6.0 5.7 6.2 6.7 
Source: Economic Survey (Various Issues). 
           *SPDC Estimates. 
 
4.  TRENDS IN FISCAL VARIABLES 
The second aspect of continuity is the persistence of a contractionary fiscal policy 
despite the rise of recessionary tendencies since the early 1990s. All the budgets in the 
last decade, including the budgets for 2000-01, have continued to target the lowering of 
the fiscal deficit through additional revenue mobilisation and cuts in development 
expenditure. This path has been pursued despite the standard textbook fact that when an 
economy falls into a recession, an expansionary fiscal policy needs to be followed. 
Expansionary fiscal policy can be attained either through the reduction in the amount of 
taxes to be paid by domestic producers or consumers and/or through an increase in 
development and welfare related government expenditures. 
Table 2 shows the trends in fiscal policy since 1987-88 and carried up to 
2000-01. The growth rate of GDP is, on the one hand, shown to decline from 6.4 
percent in 1988 to 2.6 percent in 2000-01, with average growth over the entire period 
1988–2001 being 4.5 percent. On the other hand, total tax revenue has grown at an 
average of 13.6 percent. Such a high growth rate of taxes relative to GDP growth is 
inadvisable in a recessionary period. However, the decomposition of this revenue 
growth presents a worse picture. Direct taxes have grown at 20.4 percent and indirect 
taxes at 11.9 percent. Further, while sales taxes have increased at 28.4 percent, import 
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duties have increased by only 6.0 percent; thereby, discriminating against domestic 
producers relative to competing imports. The growing importance of sales taxes can 
be discerned from the fact that the contribution of sales taxes in total taxes has 
increased from 10.8 percent in 1987-88 to 38.3 percent in 2000-01. Correspondingly, 
the decline of the importance of import duty as a revenue source can be seen from the 
fact that its contribution to total taxes has fallen from 50.4 percent in 1988 to 15.9 
percent in 2000-01. 
At the same time, the share of development expenditure in GDP over the period 
1988–2001 has on average declined by 6.4 percent; thereby, weakening domestic 
aggregate demand. The decline in Fixed Investment to GDP Ratio, shown earlier in 
Table 1, is thus understandable. The result has been growing unemployment and 
poverty, with poverty increasing on average by 5.4 percent and the population below the 
poverty line by 7.3 percent over 1988–2001. 
 
Table 2 
Trends in Fiscal and Real Variables 
(Percent) 
  Year 
Growth 
Rate of 
GDP 
Growth 
of 
Total 
Taxes 
Growth 
of 
Direct 
Taxes 
Growth
of 
Indirect
Taxes 
Growth
of 
Sales 
Taxes 
Growth 
of 
Import 
Duties 
Growth 
Rate of 
Development 
Expenditure as 
Share of GDP 
Growth
Rate of 
Poverty1
Growth 
Rate of 
Population 
Below 
Poverty2 
1987-88 6.4 19.4 16.4 19.8 43.9 23.6 –5.0 –13.6 –11.3 
1988-89 4.8 19.4 15.5 20.0 70.7 12.9 –15.5 11.4 14.3 
1989-90 4.6 10.8 18.0 9.8 38.4 14.2 3.1 12.3 15.2 
1990-91 5.6 13.7 21.3 12.5 3.2 9.7 –4.0 0.2 2.8 
1991-92 7.7 19.0 35.1 16.2 7.5 15.5 5.8 1.2 3.8 
1992-93 2.3 9.5 33.3 4.6 11.5 5.0 –20.2 2.3 4.9 
1993-94 4.5 19.3 30.9 16.3 33.9 3.6 –9.6 3.5 6.1 
1994-95 5.2 18.4 23.1 17.0 34.0 19.1 –7.9 4.8 7.4 
1995-96 6.8 16.7 29.7 12.6 16.4 7.6 –6.1 6.2 8.8 
1996-97 1.9 8.1 17.0 5.0 11.9 –4.7 –15.0 7.7 10.4 
1997-98 2.0 10.8 15.7 8.9 –3.4 –5.2 –3.7 5.7 8.2 
1998-99 4.2 10.6 10.0 10.9 34.3 –22.1 –5.3 3.1 5.5 
1999-00 3.9 1.9 –2.0 3.5 65.2 5.7 3.9 7.3 9.7 
2000-01 2.6 13.2 22.0 9.7 29.8 –0.3 –10.2 22.8 16.1 
Average  
  Growth 4.5 13.6 20.4 11.9 28.4 6.0 –6.4 5.4 7.3 
Source:  Economic Survey (Various Issues). Federal Budget in Brief (Various Issues). 
Note: 1Growth rate of the percentage of population below the poverty line. 
                2Growth rate of the number of population below the poverty line. 
Stabilisation vs. Growth 
 
457 
5.  IMPLICATIONS OF GROWTH vs. STABILISATION POLICIES 
FOR MAJOR SECTORS AND ECONOMIC VARIABLES 
The purpose of this section is to review the policy of growth and stabilisation on 
following sectors and economic variables. 
 
Manufacturing 
Manufacturing sector is one of the most important sector always affected by wrong 
government policies. In first four decades this sector got unprecedented and unjustified rate 
of affective protection which made our manufacturer unwilling to prepare themselves against 
international competitors. This process continued till 1988 when first agreement of structural 
adjustment facility with IMF was signed. The very high rate of protection was result of very 
high import duties on finish goods and very low taxes on domestic production. During this 
period the average rate import duty was between 80 to 90 percent and maximum rate of 
import duty was 350 percent. As for as the structure of domestic taxes on production was 
concerned most of the goods were exempted from sales tax and excise duties. Due to these 
very lenient tax policy the domestic producers have not tried to be competitive 
internationally. However, after 1988 this situation reverse in such a way that the domestic 
producers could not find any time or space to make themselves competitive. The average 
import duty rate fell from 90 percent to 30 percent and during the same time period almost 
all goods came under sales tax net. Between 1988 and 2001 in all agreement with IMF most 
of the conditionalities have affected manufacturing sector adversely.  Increase in oil prices, 
petroleum surcharge gas and electricity charges were all the result of stabilisation strategy 
and have damage the manufacturing sector most by increasing cost of production 
enormously. Last ten years and especially the second decade of 90s was worst for 
manufacturing sector (Table 3). In two years the growth was negative and in two years 
growth was less than 3 percent. 
Table 3 
Growth in Large-scale Manufacturing, by Industry Group 
(Percent)  
Industry Group 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98 1998-99 1999-00 2000-01 
Food Beverage and Tobacco –4.8 –5.0 33.9 1.1 –19.7 8.8 
Sugar –11.2 –6.4 45.7 –0.1 –24.1 6.4 
Textile and Apparel 1.2 –0.5 2.0 –0.8 19.0 2.7 
Leather Products –7.3 –12.1 1.0 –9.2 1.2 9.0 
Paper and Paper Board –5.7 15.6 –2.2 0.8 19.8 24.9 
Chemical Rubber and Plastic 7.9 –0.7 –3.0 7.5 8.6 8.5 
Petroleum Products 9.0 –4.1 3.7 3.9 –0.3 16.6 
Tyres and Tubes 25.9 –35.1 29.0 0.4 2.3 0.9 
Non-Metallic Mineral Products 15.2 –0.9 –1.2 –0.5 2.0 0.9 
Basic Metal Industries 2.1 1.4 –9.1 –10.1 12.5 6.7 
Metal Products and Machinery –2.7 –15.5 –6.6 29.3 16.7 0.2 
Automobile 51.6 –4.1 –4.8 7.4 –19.1 23.3 
Large Scale Manufacturing 2.8 –2.7 7.4 2.5 –0.2 7.8 
Source: Economic Survey 1999-00 and Economic Survey 2000-01. 
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The low growth of the 1990s can be attributed partly to the restructuring of the 
industrial sector following reduction in protection and partly to increasing cost of 
production, recessionary tendencies in the economy, and contractionary fiscal policies. 
 
Agriculture 
The agriculture sector has to date not been directly ‘hit’ by Structural Adjustment 
reforms. However, the extension of GST to agricultural inputs removes the ‘protection’ 
that the agriculture sector has had to date. Such extension  at a time when the agriculture 
sector performance has been at its lowest in recent history can be questionable. 
The concentration on major crops has rendered the agricultural economy highly 
vulnerable to shocks. If any one of the major crops performs poorly, the growth rate for 
the whole of agriculture and of agriculture related sectors stands adversely affected. This 
in turn affects other macroeconomic variables, i.e., tax revenues, budget deficit, current 
account deficit, exchange rate, inflation rate, unemployment, and poverty. It is very 
important to note that this is a first agreement with international agency (IMF) that has 
asked to impose taxes and remove subsidies in agriculture sector. Removal of all 
economic subsidies advocated in IMF conditionalities are to attain stabilisation will 
destroy Pakistan agriculture, which has sustained the economy for the last fifty years. 
 
Poverty 
As stated above, as of 2000-01, unemployment has grown to 6.7 percent and 
poverty to 40.1 percent. Poverty has on average been increasing at the rate of 5.4 percent 
per annum and the number of people below the poverty line has been increasing at the 
rate of 7.3 percent annually. 
The fiscal policy in last few years does take cognizance of the situation and 
identifies poverty reduction to be “the supreme objective of [Pakistan’s] economic 
strategy”. Thus, there is special focus on social safety nets, i.e., employment generation 
via a public works programme, entitled Khushaal Pakistan, expanded micro-credit 
through systems such as the Khushali Bank, an attempt to reach the chronically poor 
through a food stamp scheme, larger Zakat subventions, and a poverty alleviation fund 
in an attempt to provide additional micro-financing. 
However, it needs to be noted that social safety nets in their poverty mitigating 
role can only just begin to address the worst manifestations of poverty. The overall 
outcome in the battle against poverty hinges crucially upon broader macroeconomic 
developments relating to key determinants of poverty, e.g., growth in real capita income 
and generation of employment. 
The continuing increase in poverty can be attributed to adverse macroeconomic 
developments during the decade of the 1990s and continuing to date. Thanks to the 
single minded pursuit of stabilisation objectives at the cost of growth objectives, there 
has been a visible decline in the growth momentum of the economy. Growth in per 
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capita income has tapered off from almost 3 percent per annum during the 1980s to a 
cumulative growth of only one percent in the last five year period, i.e. 1996–2000. 
Unemployment has increased in the 1990s over 1980s by about two percentage points 
and, while recessionary conditions has kept the overall inflation rate low, food prices 
have risen from 2.9 percent in 1999-00 to 4.1 percent in 2000-01. 
 
Issues in Investor Confidence 
Investment holds the key to sustained economic development, as it provides 
capital that generates growth and employment in an economy.  Investment is a function 
of investor confidence, which is itself a function of economic and non-economic factors. 
Non-economic factors include political stability, level of facilitation/harassment by tax 
authorities, etc. Economic factors broadly comprise cost of production and aggregate 
market demand. Both are influenced by market and government variables. The former 
are largely price driven, while the latter include interest, tax, tariff, exchange, etc., rates 
regimes, utility prices, etc.  
The policy package in Pakistan, particularly over the period 1988–2001, has 
actually been contrary to the requirements of promoting investment. It has served to 
raise the cost of production and depress purchasing power and aggregate demand. 
Additionally, there has been introduced the element of a relatively unfair trade regime. 
On the one hand, the cost of production has increased through enhancement of utility 
rates, expansion of indirect taxation, raising of interest rates, and depreciation of the 
rupee, while excessive lowering of import tariffs has rendered domestic industry 
uncompetitive. On the other hand, the sustained cuts in development expenditure has 
weakened aggregate demand. Evidence of weak purchasing power and aggregate 
demand is provided by the fact that the share of Real Demand relative to Real Supply as 
a component of inflation is estimated at zero [see Bengali and Ahmed (2001)]. 
The combined impact of increases in production costs, increasingly unfair 
international competition, and weak aggregate demand has resulted in a loss of investor 
confidence. Table 1 shows that the investment to GDP ratio has declined from an 
average of 17.8 percent in the 1980s to 16.1 in the 1990s and further to 13.6 percent 
during 1999–2001. Public investment declined from 9.8 percent in the 1980s to 7.6 
percent in the 1990s and further to 6.0 percent during 1999–2001. Private investment 
showed a slight improvement of a half a percentage points in the 1990s over the 1980s, 
but declined to 7.4 percent during 1999–2001. 
 
6.  ANALYSIS OF STABILISATION TARGETS ACHIEVED 
 
Behind the Aggregates: 1999–2001 
Policy-makers have, over the post-1999 period, generally succeeded in reducing 
the budget deficit, current account deficit, and rate of inflation. As a percentage of GDP, 
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the budget deficit is down to 5.4 percent, the current account deficit is down to 1.1 
percent, and the savings deficit is down to 2 percent. The rate of inflation is down to 5.4 
percent. In theory there are different ways to achieve each target of stabilisation and 
each way has different implication. Now we will discuss what was the best way to 
achieve each target and this has been achieved in Pakistan. 
 
How Has the 2000-01 Budget Deficit Been Reduced?  
Reduction of the budget deficit, current account deficit, savings deficit, or the rate of 
inflation are all laudable macroeconomic stabilisation objectives, However, the way in which 
these targets are achieved has different distributional implications. There exists a range of 
policy options to achieve given ends, some of which are pro-poor and others which are not. 
For example, raising revenues or reducing expenditures can lower the budget 
deficit. Revenues can be raised through direct taxation or through indirect taxation: the 
former impacts the rich, while the latter largely impacts the poor. Expenditure reduction 
can be attained through outs in current expenditure or through cuts in development 
expenditure. The former impacts on existing employment, while the latter impacts on 
employment generation. However, while development expenditure is likely to create 
assets and a future stream of income, current expenditure is likely to be consumptive, 
Generally, labour productivity in employment, generated through development 
expenditure, is likely to be higher in employment generated through current expenditure, 
Thus, while employment on account of development expenditure may be productive, 
employment on account of current expenditure may be non- productive. As such, 
switching expenditure from current to development heads may increase employment and 
incomes, and reduce poverty in the future. 
It can be seen that, in 1987-88 for example, revenue and expenditure exceeded 
budgeted targets by 14 percent. 
The data highlights the fact that revenue shortfalls, current expenditure over-runs 
and cuts in development expenditure have been the norm. In two-thirds to three-fourths 
of the years between 1988 and 2001, revenue targets have failed to be met and current 
expenditure has exceeded budgeted allocations. The burden of adjustment, in this 
respect, has fallen on development expenditure, which has suffered repeated and, in 
some years, heavy declines. The cuts in development expenditure have been sustained 
since 1998-99 and reached a historic record of nearly 60 percent of budgeted allocations 
in 2000-01. Clearly, the major burden of managing budget deficits has been borne by 
development expenditure, particularly in the last three years. 
The Table 4 also indicates the distribution of the burden of adjustment between 
current and development expenditure. For example, in the year 1987-88, the sum of 
under-collection of revenue and over expenditure totalled Rs 21.3 billion. The share of 
the absorption of this additional deficit was (1) under-collection of direct taxes to the 
extent of 5.1 percent; (2) over-collection of indirect taxes to the extent of 76.6 percent; 
(3) under-collection of non-tax revenue to the extent of 57.5 percent; (4) over-spending  
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Table 4 
Ex-post Deviations in Budget Deficit 
Deviation In 
Years 
Total 
Revenue 
Total 
Expenditure 
Current 
Expenditure 
Development 
Expenditure 
Budget 
Deficit 
1987-88 8 14.0  8–35.9 8–42.5  96.6 21.9 
1988-89 9 –28.0 8–47.1 8–68.5 92.14 75.1 
1989-90 8 71.7 8–71.9 8–71.1 8–0.7 0.2 
1990-91 9 –53.6 8–46.4 8–39.1 8–7.4 100.0 
1991-92 9 –39.2 8–55.1 8–18.7 8–36.4 94.3 
1992-93 9 –53.9 8–42.7 8–34.1 8–8.7 96.6 
1993-94 9 –100.0 964.5 944.4 920.0 35.5 
1994-95 9 –100.0 919.0 90.5 918.5 81.0 
1995-96 9 –16.4 8–61.0 8–67.0 96.0 77.4 
1996-97 9 –100.0 9 33.4 910.4 923.0 66.6 
1997-98 9 –57.0 8 –43.0 8–17.9 8–25.0 100.0 
1998-99 9 –100.0 9 33.8 911.1 922.6 66.2 
1999-00 8 30.6 8 –59.7 8–78.9 919.2 29.2 
2000-01 9 –24.9 9 25.4 8–33.4 958.8 –0.4 
Average 9 –39.8 8 –20.5 8–28.9 98.4 60.3 
Source: Economic Survey (Various Issues). 
 
on current expenditure to the extent of 42.5 percent; and (5) under-spending on 
development expenditure to the extent of 6.6 percent. The residual of 21.9 percent was 
absorbed as a budget deficit. 
Similarly, in 1990-91, for example, the sum of under-collection of revenue and 
over-expenditure totalled Rs. 31.1 billion. The share of the absorption of this additional 
deficit was (1) over-collection of direct taxes to the extent of 3 percent; (2) 
under-collection of indirect taxes to the extent of 39.1 percent; (3) under-collection of 
non-tax revenue to the extent of 17.5 percent; (4) over-spending on current expenditure 
to the extent of 39.1 percent; and (5) over-spending on development expenditure to the 
extent of 7.4 percent. The addition to the deficit was absorbed by the budget deficit to 
the extent of 100 percent. 
The committed budget deficit target was achieved in two years, namely 1989-90 
and 2000-01. In 1989-90, there was an under-collection of 28.1 percent in tax revenue 
and over-spending of 71.1 percent in current expenditure, while development 
expenditure remained on target. The cushion was provided by a nearly 100 percent 
over-collection in nontax revenue. In 2000-01 too, there was a 66.2 percent 
under-collection in tax revenue and a 33.4 percent over-spending in current expenditure. 
However, unlike 1989-90, the cushion was provided to the extent of 58.8 percent by 
under-spending in development expenditure—the highest in the post-1988 period—and 
41.2 percent by over-collection in non-tax revenue. 
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A perusal of the ‘behaviour’ of the various budget heads over the period 1988–
2001 shows that tax revenue has been under-collected in 12 out of 14 years and 
over-spending in current expenditure has occurred in 10 out of 14 years. Consequently, 
the brunt of the budget deficit targeting has been borne by development expenditure, 
which has been underspent in 9 of 14 years. 
An examination of development expenditure ‘patterns’ shows that there has been 
over-spending in development expenditure in 4 out of 14 years, particularly in 1991-92 
and 1997-98. In 3 out of 4 years, enlarging the budget deficit absorbed the impact. 
However, under-expenditure has been the norm, with double digit under-expenditure in 
7 out of 14 years: 1988-89, 1993-94, 1994-95, 1996-97, 1998-99, 1999-00, and 2000-01. 
The extent of under-expenditure in 2000-01 was unprecedented. 
On average over the period 1988–2001, the share of the absorption of the 
additional deficit has been as follows: there has been (1) under-collection of direct taxes 
to the extent of 5 percent; (2) under-collection of indirect taxes to the extent of 30 
percent; (3) under-collection of non-tax revenue to the extent of 4 percent; (5) 
over-spending on current expenditure to the extent of 29 percent; and (6) under-spending 
on development expenditure to the extent of 8 percent. Up to 60 percent of the additional 
deficit has been absorbed as budget deficit. 
More recently, over 1999–2001, there has been (1) under-collection of direct 
taxes to the extent of 17.9 percent; (2) under-collection of indirect taxes to the extent of 
28.4 percent; (3) under-collection of non-tax revenue to the extent of 47.1 percent; (4) 
over-spending on current expenditure to the extent of 33.7 percent; and (5) 
under-spending on development expenditure to the extent of 33.5 percent. Up to 31.7 
percent of the additional deficit has been absorbed as budget deficit. 
A comparison of the averages of the periods 1988–2001 and 1999–2001 shows 
that under-collection of direct taxes has more than tripled, under-collection of non-tax 
revenue has increased nearly 12-fold, over-spending on current expenditure has 
increased by about one-sixth, and under-spending on development expenditure has 
increased 4-fold. It appears that, of late, the burden of achieving the committed budget 
deficit target has increasingly been borne by development expenditure, with the 
concomitant costs to the poor in terms of foregone jobs and incomes. 
 
How Has the Current Account Deficit Been Reduced? 
The current account deficit can be lowered through changes in both the trade and 
non-trade related categories. With respect to trade categories, the current account deficit 
may be reduced on account of higher export receipts of lower import payments. The 
changes may be the result of an increase in the value or volume of exports or a decrease 
in the value or volume of imports. Higher export receipts on account of higher value of 
exports are likely to accrue more foreign exchange for the same level of output, as well 
as enhancing incomes for exporters and generating growth. Higher export volume is 
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likely to generate more output and employment, leading to higher income. Lower import 
volumes, at Pakistan’s current level of development, are likely to be reflective of 
recessionary tendencies, i.e, a slow-down in economic activity, and impact adversely on 
employment, income and growth. 
With respect to non-trade categories, the current account deficit may be reduced 
through lower debt servicing on account of debt retirement or write-offs or rescheduling. 
Lower debt servicing on account of debt retirement or write-offs releases resources for 
investment or consumption without future liabilities, while debt rescheduling transfers 
liabilities to future generations. This liability can be neutralised if the resources released 
are employed for the creation of income generating assets. 
The decline in import growth is significantly greater than in export growth and  
import declines are concentrated in capital goods, which correspond to the decline in 
fixed investment. The conclusion can thus be drawn that the improvement in the current 
account gap has come about largely through import suppression, partly induced by 
stabilisation policies. (Table 5.) 
 
Table 5 
Trends in Fiscal/Economic Indicators 
Industrial Raw Material 
Fiscal Year Capital Goods Consumer Capital Consumer Goods 
1986-87 37 39 7 17 
1987-88 36 43 7 14 
1988-89 37 39 7 17 
1989-90 33 41 7 19 
1990-91 33 44 7 16 
1991-92 42 38 7 13 
1992-93 42 38 6 14 
1993-94 38 43 6 13 
1994-95 35 46 5 14 
1995-96 35 45 6 14 
1996-97 37 43 5 15 
1997-98 32 45 5 18 
1998-99 31 47 6 16 
1999-00 26 54 6 14 
2000-01 25 55 6 14 
Sources:  Statistical Supplement (2000-01). Economic Survey (Various Issues). 
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How Has the Rate of Inflation Been Reduced? 
Inflation can be lowered through controlling cost-push or demand-pull factors. 
The former involves intervening on the supply side and reducing the cost of production, 
which tends to enhance product competitiveness The latter involves intervening on the 
demand side by curtailing both purchasing power and consumption. Where consumption 
levels are already below subsistence standards, further reductions can have adverse 
effects on nutrition and health, as well as on social stability. 
A question that has been frequently raised in Pakistan has been why the inflation 
rate is high. Ironically, the relevant question today is why the inflation rate is currently 
as low as 4-5 percent and what impact it has on the poor (see Box 2.2). A key factor 
explaining the reduction in the rate of inflation is ‘monetary’ in character and, by and 
large, on account of a contractionary monetary policy. The rate of growth in money 
supply has declined sharply since 1999, largely on account of the lower monetisation of 
the budget deficit and depressed demand for credit by the private sector. Despite very 
high cost push inflation the overall inflation is low because of demand pull inflation is 
negative or at most zero. 
 
7.  CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The thrust of economic policy since 1988, as reflected in the government policies, 
has been to pursue stabilisation objectives at the cost of growth objectives. The 
mechanism for this policy has been a contractionary fiscal policy, including cuts in 
development expenditure. In our view, the policy has been counter-productive. It has 
dampened investment and curtailed purchasing power, leading to a recessionary 
situation. It has contributed directly to the increase in unemployment and poverty. That 
the policy continues to be pursued with greater vigour is unfortunate. 
The paper  also reveals that the stabilisation targets have also been achieved in a 
way in which they should not be achieved. The budget deficit that the should be 
achieved through increase in revenues or reduction in current expenditures have been 
achieved by reduction in development expenditure. This has adversely affected the GDP 
growth which in turn have increased poverty and unemployment. The current account 
deficit have been decreased significantly during this period but the current account 
deficit which should be reduced either by increasing in exports or reduction in imports 
of finished consumer goods have been reduced by reduction in imports of capital goods 
and imports of raw materials especially for the production of machinery and the capital 
goods. This also reflect the recessionary conditions in the economy which is adversely 
affecting the growth and causing increase in the unemployment and poverty. During this 
period the gap between the saving and the investment have also declined in a negative 
way. This gap should be reduced by increasing the national saving but unfortunately 
during this period both saving and investment have declined but investment have 
declined faster because of the drastically reduction in the government investment. 
Stabilisation vs. Growth 
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This paper  propose a fundamental shift in policy. The principal objective should 
be growth, with stabilisation being a secondary objective. The contractionary fiscal 
policy regime needs to be relaxed, with a shift from revenue mobilisation to current 
expenditure reduction. Development expenditure, however, needs to be enhanced even 
further, in order to create the crowd-in effect for investment, for the growth in 
employment, income, and purchasing power and for poverty to be reduced in absolute 
terms. The preoccupation with curtailing fiscal deficits needs to be reviewed. The  fiscal 
deficits can be positively employed if the amounts thus generated are devoted to 
investment in productivity enhancing infrastructure and in employment generating 
projects. 
The policy of opening up the economy more than what is required by WTO 
standards is inadvisable. In the past, domestic producers enjoyed unfair advantage 
relative to imports. A level playing field is perhaps in order. However, a new trade 
regime is now emerging, where imports are beginning to enjoy an unfair advantage 
relative to domestic producers. The cost of such a trade regime to the country's industry 
and economy and to the people in terms of unemployment and poverty is likely to be 
extremely high.  
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Comments 
 
The authors, Kaiser Bangali and Qazi Masood, have touched upon a vital 
issue of economy, especially the long-term effect, which is often ignored by planners 
and policy-makers in Pakistan. The paper has highlighted various long-term data in 
an effective way. However, being limited to fiscal policy and the paper has limited 
scope, interrelations with other variables of the economy. 
It is mentioned at the beginning that the results have been obtained from the 
Social Policy Development Centre’s 257-equation integrated social policy and 
macroeconomic model for Pakistan. There is no further information in the paper to 
elaborate the results of the equations and how they are being used in this paper. 
The literature review is too brief. It seems the study is relying only on one 
source for guidance. While discussing the policies of 1988–2001, the authors assume 
that the policy’s objective is stabilisation; it does not provide any evidence for the 
statement. The authors use Table 1 as evidence of the stabilisation policy, whereas 
they later criticise that it should not be the objective of the policy. 
The authors in conclusion say that, “we propose a shift in policy. The 
principal objective should be growth, with stabilisation being secondary objective”. 
The authors have not analysed the data before 1988, with the policy mainly driven by 
growth objectives, leading to instability in the economy, reaching an alarming rate 
over time, and nullifying the impact of growth. 
Furthermore the authors’ recommendation for opening up the economy more 
to WTO standards, and substituting domestic debt by external debt, is inherently 
dangerous. This is in line with stabilisation policies rather than growth-oriented 
policies. 
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